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A little-known law moves money into America’s low-income neighborhoods—but for
whose benefit?
The Community Reinvestment Act gives community advocates leverage over banks... Terms
and conditions apply.
By Emily Suzanne Lever
Philip Wischerth has the dubious distinction of being the city’s top evictor.
Wischerth collects rent from tenants in 12,789 apartments across all five boroughs, most
notably Lefrak City. In 2018, he used city marshalls and court proceedings to evict 189
households, the most of any landlord in the city.
That’s one eviction in every 67 apartments—three times the citywide average.
Though Wischerth is the record-holder in terms of sheer numbers, another landlord, Ved
Parkash, had a staggering rate of eviction in 2018: one eviction for every 24 units of the 4,482
residential units he owned. That’s an eviction rate of over 4%—in the same ballpark as some of
the neighborhoods hardest hit by eviction in the entire city, like Bedford Park in the Bronx.
Wischerth and Parkash are just two of the landlords with the most evictions in the city, landing
them on the NYC Worst Evictors List compiled by tenant advocates Right to Council NYC
Coalition and Just Fix NYC. But despite infamous reputations, they had no problem securing
loans from major banks.
Wischerth received loans from Chase, Wells Fargo, M&T Bank and Capital One, according to
ACRIS records. The same records indicate that Parkash is funded by Signature Bank, New
York Community Bank, Peapack Gladstone and Capital One.
While tenant churn, dilapidated buildings, reams of lawsuits and bad publicity might seem like
signs of a problematic investment, these landlords (and others like them) have the support of
major financial institutions. Under a federal anti-redlining financial regulation, the Community
Reinvestment Act, banks that lend to even the shadiest landlords may even receive credit for
serving the low-income communities that they are helping those landlords to exploit.
A REACTION TO REDLINING
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed in 1977 as a form of redress for
redlining, a practice that began following the Great Migration in which banks systematically
denied home loans and mortgages to black homeowners. It is a federal law that asserts banks
have an obligation to invest in low-income neighborhoods in the area they operate in.
It calls for banks to be evaluated every 2 to 5 years on their compliance. The ratings are posted
publicly. Virtually all banks pass their exams (0.3% of banks have been judged to be in
“substantial noncompliance” with the legislation since 1990), which advocates see as a sign of
grade inflation.

While the consequences of redlining persist to this day, the practice does not endure in the
exact same form: some of the areas left for dead in the 60s and 70s are now ground zero for
gentrification. As the economic situation shifts from redlining, which is a pattern of deliberate
underinvestment, to speculative
investment pouring into formerly redlined
neighborhoods, advocates say the CRA
has sometimes rewarded investments that
fund displacement because regulators
aren’t empowered to distinguish between
predatory investments and constructive
ones.
“The folks leading the charge at the time
fundamentally believed they could get the
banks to work for them the way they
worked for other non redlined
communities,” explains Gregory Jost, a
community organizer for the South Bronx
nonprofit developer Banana Kelly, who is
writing a book on the history of redlining in
the Bronx.
But over the years, the legislation has become bureaucratic, overcomplicated, and
disconnected from the communities in which anti-redlining organizing took place, Jost argues:
“The people that actually were around for the CRA’s passage are for the most part no longer
with us and over the past 45 years it’s become disconnected from the grassroots.”
The CRA is a fairly simple law, but its enforcement metrics are complex and that has resulted in
it becoming restricted to the province of experts. It’s arguably this technocratization that has
allowed for toothless enforcement.
“We have to push back against unnecessary complication of matters. The metrics don’t have to
be super complicated,” Jost said.
“That’s always been a tool of people in power to make things wonkier than they actually need to
be: Make it confusing to keep it out of the hands of the people.”
To be sure, the CRA does divert some of the banks’ wealth towards financial commitments
that wouldn’t otherwise happen. Some of the investments that count toward CRA compliance
are investments in affordable housing developments—a key component of affordable housing
policy in New York City, which relies heavily on public-private partnerships.
According to the city Department of Housing Preservation and Development, all the public
money the agency puts into new affordable projects is matched approximately four times over
by infusions of private capital, which are incentivized by the CRA. (Mayor Bill de Blasio’s
affordable housing plan, announced in 2014, forecasted a contribution of $30 billion of private
money to promise a total investment of $41 billion in affordable housing.)

Where the CRA has historically had some teeth is at the level of community banks, according
to Michelle Neuebarger, a staffer at Cypress Hills Local Development Corporation since 1984.
“When I first started here,” Neuebarger said, “there were banks that did not provide a single
mortgage loan. Not one.” Among those banks were City National and Anchor Savings Bank.
Cypress Hills LDC was able to lobby a local representative who sat on the State Senate
Banking Committee to pressure these state-chartered banks to respect their CRA obligations.
Cypress Hills LDC has been able to secure loans to build deeply affordable housing that, on
paper, would have been a tough sell to underwriters, Neuebarger said. “Everyone’s looking at
your balance sheet. We’ve gotten multi-million-dollar deals even though, on the strength of our
balance sheet, it would not go through because all of our profits go back into organizing.”
While the CRA has secured crucial funding for community development projects, its power is
most easily wielded against smaller community banks—the kind that can be swayed through
local political mechanisms, like, say, appealing to a local State Senator who might sit on the
state legislature’s finance committee. But in recent years, wave of mergers and acquisitions has
led to fewer state-chartered banks, leaving the landscape dominated by megabanks that are in
effect too powerful to regulate.
Still, the legislation remains an important achievement, Neuebarger said.
“It’s one of the few tools we have to get positive, affirmative investment in our communities.
People fought really hard for it.”
THE PROBLEM WITH ENFORCEMENT
The “big three” federal financial regulators are in charge of CRA compliance: the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the
Federal Reserve. Banks are evaluated in each state they operate in by one of the three
regulators in conjunction with the state regulator. Each federal and state agency has its own
distinctive approach towards CRA compliance.
In New York state, regulators are to evaluate banks’ lending patterns according their impact on
communities’ quality and affordability of housing. If a landlord allows their properties to fall into
disrepair or contributes to a decrease in affordable housing—for example, if a landlord’s
buildings contain 800 fewer rent-stabilized now than ten years ago, which happened under
Donald Hastings, a landlord working for A&E Management—state financial regulators have the
power to sanction the banks that fund them. But that does not appear to have happened.
Five years ago, The New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) in 2013 set out
what it called Slumlord Prevention Guidelines. The agency, which conducts state CRA exams
along with the FDIC, said in a press release that not all the loans a bank made in a low to
moderate income community would count toward CRA compliance.

If the underwriting on a loan is premised on jacking up the rent on rent-stabilized units in the
future to provide a return on investment, or if the building being underwritten has numerous
housing code violations, DFS said it would punish the bank.
“Loans that undermine affordable housing or neighborhood conditions, facilitate substandard
living conditions, or are underwritten in an unsound manner will not be eligible for CRA credit,”
according to DFS guidelines. “For example, loans to borrowers with a high number of housing
code violations or loans that are too highly leveraged (too much debt financing) will not receive
CRA credit.”
That means the regulator should “knock out” the offending loan from consideration rather than
taking that loan into consideration and possibly lowering a bank’s grade. DFS confirmed this is
how the agency proceeds but would not comment on whether the slumlord prevention
guidelines had resulted in any banks actually being downgraded on the CRA ratings.
The problem with “knocking out” loans deemed bad is that changing urban economics have
lessened the bite of this sanction. When redlining was at its peak, removing a loan from CRA
consideration would have been a harsher measure. By definition, banks were reluctant to lend
in redlined neighborhoods, so to “knock out” a loan when those loans are few and far between
might have represented a hit to a bank’s CRA rating. But today, with investment pouring into
“developing” and “up-and-coming” neighborhoods, banks now have plenty of other loans to
submit for consideration instead.
Some of the smaller local banks named and shamed by the tenant advocates and then by
DFS—namely Signature Bank and New York Community Bank—announced they were
adopting best practices for multifamily lending and holding themselves to a higher standard
than regulators required, a move advocates applauded. There are some indications that banks
reference data put forth by advocates to track the worst landlords and the most poorly
maintained buildings as part of their due diligence process in issuing loans. But all of this is
elective.
After all, what incentive do they have to change their lending practices? All of the banks that
lent to the city’s worst landlords passed their state CRA exams with a grade of “satisfactory” or
“outstanding,” meaning financial regulators judge that these banks are doing a good job at
contributing to low-income communities.
In fact, since 1990—which is as far back as the data available from the federal regulators
goes—only 238 banks in the entire United States have received a CRA rating of “substantial
noncompliance” out of 75,926 exams. That’s 0.3%. A further 2,515 received a rating of “needs
to improve.” The other 95.78% received outstanding or satisfactory ratings.

Even in the highly unlikely event that a bank receives a failing rating, it doesn’t necessarily
come with real consequences, advocates say. Since 1990, all CRA ratings are posted publicly
online, which means reputational consequences for a bad rating, if a bank cares about that sort
of thing. (Which, to be clear, some of them do.) But other consequences are lacking.
If a bank is downgraded from Satisfactory to Needs to Improve, the enforcement
consequences aren’t immediate: a bad CRA rating can result in regulators not approving a
merger or an acquisition. This isn’t enough, according to Gregory Jost, the organizer at Banana
Kelly. They offer carrots to reward banks for CRA commitments—getting regulatory approval
for things like mergers and acquisitions depend on a bank’s CRA rating—but there are few
actually punitive sticks to punish bad actors.
“There aren’t enough sticks, and the banks don’t want there to be sticks,” Jost said.
Another flaw is actually baked into the original text of the CRA: even though it was fought for
as a remedy to a racist practice, the CRA does not take race into account. It instead
incentivizes banks to invest not specifically in black communities or communities of color, but
in low- and moderate- income neighborhoods.
Furthermore, it does not distinguish between lending to a rich person who wants a home loan
to buy a house in a poor neighborhood or to a poor person who wants to buy in that same
neighborhood: both loans would be equally rewarded in a bank’s CRA exam.
That’s because CRA was a product of its historical context, and it plays something of a
different role today. The CRA simply rewards banks for making a sufficient amount loans in
poor and working-class neighborhoods, because at the time when it was passed these
neighborhoods were starved for investment.

But today, at least in New York City, previously underinvested neighborhoods are dealing with
a very different problem: overinvestment driving up real estate prices and displacing
low-income people. In rewarding banks for making a high volume of loans in poor areas, the
CRA can end up validating investments that spur gentrification—which displaces the exact
communities the CRA is supposed to benefit.
For example, when Cypress Hills was rezoned as part of the East New York rezoning—Bill de
Blasio’s first foray into such a reform—this led to speculative investment, according to
Neugebauer, from Cypress Hills LDC. Long-standing homeowners (the neighborhood has
many first-generation homeowners) were targeted. House-flipping became endemic. Even as
these changes continue, banks will not cease to get credit for lending in Cypress Hills because
it remains a low-income census tract—even if they give a home loan to a wealthier home buyer
looking to the neighborhood to snag a deal.
“Banks shouldn’t get CRA credit for market-rate housing or to high- and middle-income
people,” Neugebauer said.
The CRA was neither designed with gentrification in mind nor updated to counteract it, which is
why, as with many an initiative to develop low-income communities, the flows of money
continue to rise to the top.
“The CRA’s shortcoming is that it’s just about money coming into the place,” Gregory Jost says.
“It doesn’t specify who the money should go to.”

PROPOSED REFORMS
While community groups beseech regulators for structural changes to the CRA, the baking
industry is doing the same.
Both national and community banks have decried the burdensome complexity of the
regulations they face, including the CRA. Groups like the Independent Community Bankers of
America (ICBA), an association of community-based banks, say their members are crushed
under regulatory burdens and urgently need CRA reform. The ICBA has called for a wholesale
repeal of section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires banks to disclose demographic
data about their small business loans in order to detect discrimination in lending.
The common argument is that small banks have a raw deal and cannot afford to compete with
megabanks while also meeting regulations.
But even as banks clamor for relief from the burden they say they are struggling with, they
somehow just keep on getting richer, according to Georgetown Law professor and financial
regulation scholar Adam Levitin.
“Community banks and credit union trade associations often point to consolidation in their
sectors as evidence that their industries are in trouble (for which the solution is invariably
regulatory relief of some sort),” Levitin told the Senate Banking Committee in 2017. But

community banks already do get a pass on many a consumer finance regulation that their
larger competitors are subject to, he said. “Overregulation is not the problem facing community
banks...The percentage of profitable community banks at the end of the first quarter of 2017
was the highest it has been in the last twenty years.”
From 2010 to 2017, the average community bank returned a 225% pre-tax profit to
shareholders. Mega-banks (a Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan, for example) returned to
shareholders, on average, 320%. That means a $100 investment in a community bank in 2010
would have returned $325 in 2017 before taxes; the same investment in a mega-bank would
have returned $420.
“Even as American families are struggling, the banking industry is doing the best it has in years.
In such circumstances it takes a certain brazenness to push deregulatory proposals that have
nothing to do with fostering economic growth or equitable distribution of growth, only about
improving banks’ bottom line,” Levitin told the Senate Banking Committee.
Even as banks post their highest profits since Dodd-Frank, median pre-tax income for all but
the top 10% of American households has actually fallen. This can’t be reduced to a direct
consequence of the financial sector’s activities—not without much more study, anyway—but it
is certainly hard to argue that the CRA has hobbled banks from making profits because it has
resulted in too much redistribution of wealth. While the CRA redistributes some amount of
wealth to poorer communities, it hasn’t served to actually enrich them.
That reality has not stopped the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) from proposing
a deregulatory reform to the CRA. The OCC put out a notice in August 2018 that it was planning
to “transform or modernize” the CRA with a focus on, among other things, “clarifying and
expanding the types of activities eligible for CRA consideration.”
One of the reforms floated by the OCC was the “one ratio,” which would mean the standard for
CRA compliance would simply be that a bank reinvest a flat percentage of its deposits into
low-income communities. CRA examinations do look at the percentage of a bank’s loans that
go to low-income borrowers or community development activities, but the OCC’s proposal
was taken to mean something else: a CRA score would reflect only the dollar amount a bank
invests in low- and moderate-income census tracts divided by the bank’s total assets.
In other words, a new version of the CRA could require banks to invest a certain dollar amount
in low-income areas without specifying what kinds of investments they could be. This would
certainly lift the real or imagined regulatory burden. “The comptroller has a notion that this
would make life easier for bank CEOs,” says Josh Silver of the National Community
Reinvestment Corporation.
OCC comptroller Joseph Otting is a former bank CEO himself (many financial regulators come
from the securities industry). As CEO of OneWest, Otting clashed with CRA enforcement after
the bank’s much-criticized history of foreclosures during the financial crisis came back to bite.
According to records obtained by the Intercept, Otting orchestrated the posting of hundreds of
fake positive public comments on OneWest’s merger with CIT to counteract the community
groups that were demanding the merger be nixed under the CRA because of OneWest’s
previous activities.

The OCC at the time knew about the fabricated comments and approved the merger anyway
according to the Intercept. But Otting, having become the head of the agency, is now a fox in
the henhouse. He has described his experience with the merger as a motivating factor in his
push for CRA reform, saying he wanted to prevent community groups from being able to “pole
vault in and hold [bankers] hostage.”
The one ratio would certainly take leverage away from community groups. And it would give
banks a path to knock out their CRA obligations in the most expedient way possible: make a
few big loans to big projects in low-income neighborhoods rather than make hundreds of
smaller ones. This could mean low-income homeowners or businesspeople would be denied
the benefits of CRA funding, Silver says. “If a bank could do a large economic development
project like a hotel or a supermarket, it could hurt small business and home loans.”
An additional proposal raised community advocates’ hackles even further: making any
investment in an opportunity zone eligible for CRA credit.
“Opportunity zones” are zones designated by state governors and the Treasury Department as
in need of investment under a 2017 bipartisan tax incentive. Most zones are in urban areas. In
New York City, some of the city’s poorer neighborhoods like Brownsville are opportunity
zones, but so are affluent and developed areas like Brooklyn Navy Yard. Opportunity zones
have been described as a “jackpot” for developers and a “gentrification subsidy.”
Providing CRA credit for any and all opportunity zone investment is a further incentive for
speculative investment, Silver said. “We don’t want credit for luxury condos in opportunity
zones in CRA exams.”
The OCC’s initial (and vague) announcement is expected to be followed up on this month,
though it keeps being pushed back. While the other two big regulators are more incremental in
their view of the legislation, Chairman Jelena McWilliams has signaled her agency's willingness
to support the plan with conditions, American Banker reports.
But even those who fear what the OCC might do under the guise of modernization think the
CRA does need to be modernized. For one thing, non-bank lenders (like Quicken Loans) or
financial technology companies are not subject to the CRA at all, a loophole that could be
easily closed.
Amending the CRA’s enforcement metrics is another central concern. According to Georges
Clement, a data analyst at Just Fix NYC who participated in creating the Worst Evictors list, the
fact that regulators and some banks are using advocate-created data analysis is a harbinger of
what positive CRA reform could look like.
Pointing to the database whoownswhat.justfix.nyc, the public advocate’s Worst Landlords list
and UNHP’s Building Indicator Project, Clement said, “This type of work is really critical to
showing the type of enforcement that can happen in terms of quality of investments.”
Perhaps the most fundamental reform would be to make the CRA race-conscious. While it was
passed as a response to a racist policy, the Act itself is colorblind. A proposal to track the race

and gender of borrowers and assess the racial and gendered impact of a bank’s lending
patterns was rejected in 1999 during Bill Clinton’s updating of the legislation.
Bed-Stuy City Councilman Robert Cornegy, whose historically-black district has the highest
levels of home equity in the country, argues that because black homeownership was what
redlining wanted to prevent, it should also be what the CRA aims to promote.
In a speech in September 2018 at a conference on the aftermath of the financial crisis, Cornegy
voiced a demand that banks be evaluated based on racial impact assessments of their lending.
“how are you building wealth for communities of color? Because there’s a history of stripping
wealth from communities of color,” Cornegy said.
“There are conscious decisions that drive who gets the spoils of this great country.”

